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THE DATA BREACH EPIDEMIC: A MODERN LEGAL ANALYSIS
Laura A. Hendee*
Abstract
This Note sheds light on the major legal issues surrounding the
numerous data breaches that plague our modern technology-driven
society. Current laws in the United States vary widely in how they handle
the resolution of harm to unsuspecting victims of data breaches. The issue
of Article III standing is commonly at the forefront of the conflict and
discussion in this area, which has resulted in a substantial circuit split in
the United States. The newly enacted California Consumer Privacy Act
will likely have a major impact in this area of the law and will
undoubtedly influence how consumers’ personal information is handled
in the years to come.
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INTRODUCTION
It seems like every day there is a new article headline in the news or
new email in your inbox stating something to the effect of, “Company X
Announces New Data Breach,” or the even more alarming, “We found
your information in another company’s data breach.” In reality, it does
not just seem like it: on average, there are new company data breaches
every day.1 In fact, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports that there have
been over 9,600 data breaches since 2005, exposing over 11,500,000,000
personal records.2 These are disturbing statistics, and as the variety of
industries and types of businesses impacted by breaches each year
continue to increase, many consumers are beginning to realize that such
breaches have become “the new normal.”3 The question is not “if” a
breach will occur, but “when” a breach will occur.4
A “data breach” is defined as “a confirmed incident in which sensitive,
confidential or otherwise protected data has been accessed and/or
disclosed in an unauthorized fashion.”5 They can be caused by many
things, including but not limited to weak passwords, missing software
patches that are exploited, lost or stolen electronic devices, unauthorized
exposure during information transit, hackers exploiting unsecured
wireless networks, and social engineering (i.e., email phishing).6 With so
many data breaches occurring each year, several of them large in terms
of the number of impacted individuals and the volume of data acquired,
it follows that a number of those individuals are taking action.7 Such data
breaches frequently make headlines and provoke litigation brought by
1. See Davey Winder, Data Breaches Expose 4.1 Billion Records in First Six Months of
2019, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2019, 6:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/08/20/
data-breaches-expose-41-billion-records-in-first-six-months-of-2019/. See also Daniel Funke, By
the Numbers: How Common Are Data Breaches—and What Can You Do About Them?,
POLITIFACT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/article/2019/sep/23/numbers-howcommon-are-data-breaches-and-what-can-/.
2. See Daniel Funke, supra note 1.
3. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-ofYear-Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Margaret Rouse, Essential Guide: GDPR Compliance Requirements for CRM
Managers—Definition: Data Breach, SEARCHSECURITY, (last updated May 2019)
https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/data-breach.
6. Id.
7. See David Balser et al., Insight: Data Breach Litigation Trends to Watch, BLOOMBERG
L. (Mar. 4, 2019, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/insightdata-breach-litigation-trends-to-watch.
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consumers, often leading to large class action lawsuits.8 After the passage
of the Class Action Fairness Act,9 most data breach lawsuits have been
brought in federal court.10 Because of the lack of clarity provided by
courts and legislatures in the area of data privacy litigation, some of the
most noteworthy data breach litigation developments in 2018 resulted in
large consumer class action settlements.11 This settlement trend will
likely continue unless further guidance is provided or a more clearly
defined legal standard develops surrounding the implementation of
reasonable security measures that are effective in the current state of
advancing technology and cybersecurity.12
One of the major reasons for the lack of clarity regarding data breach
litigation outcomes across the country spurs from the circuit split on the
issue of standing.13 Courts dismiss many of these data breach cases
because plaintiffs lack a cognizable injury-in-fact, which is a major
component for Article III standing.14 Generally, the First, Second, Fourth,
and Eighth Circuits have rejected a finding of standing on the particular
facts of the cases heard in these circuits, while leaving the door open for
future cases, noting that the assessment of risk of future harm is a factspecific inquiry.15 Conversely, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits have held that, based on the facts of the particular cases, the risk
of future harm from a data breach was an injury sufficient for standing.16
The split regarding the existence of a cognizable injury centers around
the risk of future identity theft, risk of future fraud, monitoring
expenditures, and other similar costs.17 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
turned down the opportunity to opine on this subject, further solidifying
the circuit split.18
8. Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011) (extending federal diversity jurisdiction to all class actions
in which minimal diversity exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million).
10. Megan Dowty, Life is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data
Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017).
11. See Balser et al., supra note 7.
12. See Balser et al., supra note 7.
13. David L. Silverman, Developments in Data Security Breach Liability, 74 BUS. L. 217,
217 (2018).
14. Dowty, supra note 10, at 686.
15. See Silverman, supra note 13; see infra Part II (discussing specific relevant cases from
each circuit in the circuit split).
16. See sources cited supra note 15.
17. Dowty, supra note 10, at 686–87.
18. See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 981 (2018).
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Some states, such as California, are passing stricter consumer privacy
laws that will likely impact the future of data privacy litigation in those
particular jurisdictions.19 There have also been attempts to pass federal
legislation that would potentially preempt state laws, but so far none of
those attempts have succeeded.20 Despite this lack of a clearly defined
national standard, companies need to start employing techniques that will
reduce their litigation exposure. Some options for accomplishing this
include the implementation of a minimum level of security controls21 and
careful drafting of arbitration clauses and class action waivers22 in the
company’s terms and conditions.
I. DATA BREACHES, IMPACT OF INFORMATION THEFT & CURRENT
GOVERNING LAW
A. Data Breaches: Prevalence Today & Resulting Costs to Victims
As data breaches and hacks continue to occur, the privacy of our
personal information remains constantly at risk, even if we believe the
companies that we share our data with are trustworthy and
technologically adept. Hackers continue to improve their skills and find
new unpredictable methods of using technology to procure personal
information from companies and individuals.23 Unfortunately, the rate of
technological development by these hackers seems to consistently
outpace the policy makers in this area. This contributes to the general
tensions on the subject and begs the question of why there has been so
little progress in preventing data breaches and the thefts that often
follow.24 For example, in the last five years alone there have been several
major corporate data breaches involving companies such as Target,
Yahoo!, Home Depot, Sony Pictures and Entertainment, Anthem Health

19. See generally California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100
(West 2018).
20. See Stephen Jones, Data Breaches, Bitcoin, and Blockchain Technology: A Modern
Approach to the Data-Security Crisis, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 783, 793–94 (2018).
21. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT 31
(Feb. 2016), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/dbr/2016-data-breach-report.pdf.
22. See Alexis Buese, Calif. Privacy Law Will Likely Prompt Flood of Class Actions,
LAW360 (May 15, 2019, 11:41 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1159313/calif-privacylaw-will-likely-prompt-flood-of-class-actions.
23. See Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion, and the Modern Data
Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771, 773 (2017).
24. Id. at 773.
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Insurance, HSBC Finance Corporation, Ashley Madison, and Equifax,
just to name a few.25
Data breaches impact both the consumers whose records are exposed
and the companies whose lack of appropriate security measures lead to
the particular breach. The companies who are hacked, and ultimately leak
such consumer information, are exposed to great financial harm.26 The
average cost to businesses per leaked record is reported at $150,27 and the
global cost of data breaches is estimated to increase to $2.1 trillion28 by
the end of 2019. These figures have consistently increased since 2017 and
this trend may continue.29 Further, customers with compromised credit
card information or other personal data because of a data breach are often
reluctant to do business with the same company, thus severing the
relationship and resulting in the loss of a customer’s lifetime value for the
business.30
Repercussions on the consumer side typically center around the risk
of future identity theft or fraud and the corresponding identity theft
monitoring expenses, temporary account cancellations, and generalized
stress and anxiety post-breach.31 This is especially concerning given the
general population’s dependence on the Internet and will likely have the
greatest impact on future generations. Future generations are at risk of
serious identity theft issues that may occur when these individuals are
still very young, which in turn may potentially impact their future ability
to obtain loans or purchase homes, cars, and other valuable assets later in
life that require an inquiry into credit scores.32 All parties to a data breach
suffer to some degree, and it is up to the policy-makers of the country to
ultimately combat these issues by passing effective standards that will
help protect future individuals from becoming victims of such harmful
actions.

25. Id. at 780–83.
26. See Jones, supra note 20, at 789.
27. IBM SECURITY, COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT 13 (2019),
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/ZBZLY7KL.
28. Shayla Price, The Real Cost of Ecommerce Data Breaches, Espionage, and Security
Mismanagement, BIGCOMMERCE: ECOMMERCE SECURITY BLOG, https://www.bigcommerce.com
/blog/data-breaches/#the-costs-of-a-data-breach (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
29. IBM SECURITY, supra note 27, at 19.
30. See Price, supra note 28.
31. See Jones, supra note 20, at 788; Dowty, supra note 10, at 686; Price, supra note 28.
32. Jones, supra note 20, at 788–89; see also Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Why Millennials
Should be Really Worried about the Equifax Breach, CNN MONEY (Sept. 15, 2017, 4:21 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/15/pf/millennials-equifax-breach/index.html.
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B. Impact of Information Theft: The Hacker’s Timeline
So, what actually happens after consumer personal information is
stolen in a company’s data breach? Hackers use the information in a
variety of ways. They may: (1) use the stolen information to interfere with
business operations, for example, hackers commonly sell internal
business plans, forecasts, and market analyses to competitors; (2) steal
data for the purposes of extortion, for example, ransomware attacks
where the hacker demands payment if the company wants to unlock the
stolen or restricted files; or (3) target consumer data like names,
addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, passwords, credit card
numbers, and social security numbers to leverage such information for
financial gain on the dark web, which often results in identity theft that is
sold to the highest bidder.33 Of further concern, identity thieves often
exploit stolen information within minutes of obtaining it.34
The Federal Trade Commission’s Office of Technology Research &
Investigation (FTC’s Tech. Office) performed an experiment in 2017 to
discover what actually happens when stolen personal information is made
public and how quickly thieves attempt to make unauthorized use of the
information.35 The FTC’s Tech. Office created personal information
belonging to 100 fake people that was designed to look like a stolen
database of consumer credentials and posted that information on a site
frequented by hackers on two occasions.36 For two weeks after they
posted to the site, the FTC’s Tech. Office monitored “all email access
attempts, payment account access attempts, attempted credit card
charges, and texts and calls received by phone numbers.”37 The first
posting of information received about 100 views, and the second posting
received about 550 views.38 After the initial posting, it only took 90
minutes for the first unauthorized attempt to use the stolen fake
information; then, after the second posting, it only took nine minutes.39
Furthermore, the total number of attempts to use the information totaled

33. See Price, supra note 28.
34. See Lesley Fair, Sensitive Consumer Data Posted Online (and the FTC Knows Who Did
It), FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (May 24, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/05/sensitive-consumer-data-posted-online-ftc-knowswho-did-it.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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119 in the first week and 1,108 in the second week.40 Tracking of
attempted illegal purchases over the two weeks lead to a variety of
categories of charges, with the top five including: (1) retailers; (2)
unknown; (3) gaming; (4) entertainment; and (5) e-payment services.41
The experiment revealed how incredibly fast large amounts of stolen
personal information can spread across the dark web. The above
experiment only used the data of 100 hypothetical victims of information
theft and only tracked the impact for two weeks following the posting of
the information. For a startling perspective, the Equifax data breach
exposed personal information of approximately 147 million individuals
and that breach occurred two years ago in 2017.42 The number of attempts
of unauthorized use of such information from that one data breach alone
is likely massive and will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the lives
of those real breach victims.
C. Current Data Breach Laws in the United States
Federal data breach regulations are limited in their scope and apply
almost exclusively to industries such as banking, finance, healthcare, and
credit reporting.43 Such statutes typically mandate that companies in each
industry implement reasonable procedures to protect consumer
information from prohibited disclosure.44 Though this seems like a
regulation that would result in something positive, it lacks any
explanation or examples of what would qualify as “reasonable
procedures” and it lacks guidance on how companies should assess their
vulnerability for future data breaches.45 The ambiguity of these federal
statutes creates confusion and reinforces the wide array of security
standards used nationwide, which are often effective.
If consumers recognize that they are victims of such statutory
violations under the industry-specific federal law and bring a complaint
against a company, they usually face an additional hurdle when arguing
for federal standing and the interpretation of the injury requirement.46 The
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Lesley Fair, $575 Million Equifax Settlement Illustrates Security Basics for Your
Business, FED. TRADE COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (July 22, 2019, 6:48 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/575-million-equifax-settlementillustrates-security-basics.
43. Jones, supra note 20, at 792.
44. See Jones, supra note 20, at 792.
45. See Jones, supra note 20, at 792. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a).
46. See infra Section II.A.
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Supreme Court of the United States has arrived at conflicting conclusions
in regard to what actually satisfies this requirement, which has resulted
in a federal circuit split.47 Inevitably this adds to the outcome uncertainty
for both plaintiffs and defendants, and since companies typically settle
their disputes out of court,48 courts have not been able to give opinions
regarding their judgment on the merits of these claims. Notably, this
impacts future litigation because the judicial system has not yet had the
opportunity to interpret the meaning of what “reasonable procedures”
should be in place to satisfy what is mandated by the federal statutes for
protection of consumer personal information.
Every state (plus the District of Columbia and a number of United
States Territories) has enacted legislation requiring entities to notify
victims of security breaches that release personally identifiable
information.49 Each state’s laws on security breaches usually set forth
who must comply with the law, a definition of what constitutes
“personally identifiable information” (which, surprisingly, varies state to
state), what constitutes a breach, timing and appropriate method of notice,
and certain exemptions.50 Companies involved in a data breach are
expected to comply with the various data-related statutes for each state
where they do business.51 However, the large range of varying regulations
in this area, coupled with the added confusion related to standing present
a burden for both the breached companies and the consumers seeking
relief.52
Though data breach laws at the state level vary, they typically share
the exception that notification is only required when compromised data
was not encrypted (or when the encryption key was also compromised in
the breach).53 A number of state statutes require companies that collect
consumer personal information to implement “reasonable procedures” to
47. Jones, supra note 20, at 794–95; see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 440–
41 (2013) (suggesting a high burden of proof to meet the "certainly impeding" harm requirement);
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (holding that though the plaintiff alleged a
federal statutory violation by the defendant, a concrete injury must also be shown); see also infra
Section II.A.
48. See Jones, supra note 20, at 793.
49. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [hereinafter NCSL].
50. Id.
51. Jones, supra note 20, at 791–92; see generally NCSL, supra note 49 (showing the
varying statutes related to this subject for each state).
52. See Jones, supra note 20, at 792.
53. Jones, supra note 20, at 796.
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protect the information.54 However, similar to the federal statutes that
require such “reasonable procedures,” the state laws do not provide any
guidance regarding the types of procedures considered reasonable and
they also do not shed light on how companies should assess their
vulnerability for future data breaches.55 And the most notable differences
across the state statutes are how broad or narrow they define “personal
information,” whether they provide consumers with an express cause of
action, the severity of the penalties for violations, and the range of time
that breached companies have to notify consumers and regulatory
agencies of the breach.56
The state of Florida’s data and personal information protection
statutes are typical examples of what any state statutes may look like in
this area. These data breach laws apply to any entity that acquires,
maintains, stores, or uses personal information.57 Entities are required to
take “reasonable measures” to protect and secure data in electronic form
containing personal information.58 The statute defines “breach of
security” or “breach” as unauthorized access of data in electronic form
containing personal information, with an exception for certain situations
where information is accessed in good faith by employees or agents. 59 It
does not apply to encrypted or redacted information, or information
secured in some other way that renders it unreadable (as long as the
encryption key is not also compromised).60 Within the statute “personal
information” is defined as an individual’s first and last name or first initial
and last name plus one or more of the following: Social Security number,
driver’s license or passport number, military identification number, any
similar form of government identification number that can be used to
verify the individual’s identity, financial account number or credit or
debit card number with any security codes required, medical information,
or health insurance policies or subscriber identification numbers.61
Additionally, personal information may also include a username or e-mail
address, in combination with a password or security question and answer

54. Jones, supra note 20, at 796−97.
55. Jones, supra note 20, at 797.
56. Jones, supra note 20, at 796−97.
57. FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b) (2019).
58. Id. § 501.171(2). The vague “reasonable measures” language, id., provides little
guidance to businesses for best prevention practices.
59. Id. § 501.171(1)(a).
60. Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(2).
61. Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(a).
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that would permit access to an online account.62 Florida’s statute does not
provide a private cause of action.63
Florida’s notification requirement varies depending on whether the
breached entity is notifying an individual or a regulatory agency.64 For
individuals, notifications must be given in writing to each individual in
the state whose personal information was, or if the entity reasonably
believes it was, accessed as a result of the breach.65 The notice shall be
made “as expeditiously as practicable and without unreasonable
delay . . . but no later than 30 days after the determination of the breach
or reason to believe the breach occurred” and must include the date(s) of
the breach, a description of the personal information accessed or believed
to be accessed, and contact information for the breached entity.66 For
regulators, the breached entity must notify the Florida Department of
Legal Affairs no later than 30 days following the identification of the
breach if 500 or more individuals within the state are affected by the
breach.67 Further, third parties that maintain personal information on
behalf of the breached entity must notify that entity no later than 10 days
after determination of the breach.68 Violations of the notice requirement
may result in civil penalties and are considered “unfair or deceptive trade
practices.”69 The civil penalties may consist of up to $1,000 per day for
each day up to the first 30 days following a violation and $50,000 for
each subsequent 30-day period or portion thereof for up to 180 days,
capping at a ceiling of $500,000.70 These penalties are per breach, not per
affected individual.71
The difficulties that both consumers and businesses must overcome
from the current data breach regulations on the federal and state levels
are clear. Unfortunately, the subsequent path going forward after
overcoming those difficulties is not so clear. The following sections of
this Article summarize and examine the split among the federal circuit
courts, the forthcoming state regulations that will likely have a substantial
impact on data protection laws across the country, and the potential

62. Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(b).
63. Id. § 501.171(10).
64. Compare FLA. STAT. § 501.171(3), with FLA. STAT. § 501.171(4).
65. Id. § 501.171(4)(a), (d).
66. Id. § 501.171(4)(a), (e).
67. Id. § 501.171(3)(a). Fifteen additional days may be allowed if there is good cause for
delay provided in writing to the department within 30 days after determination of the breach or
reason to believe a breach occurred. Id.
68. Id. § 501.171(6)(a).
69. Id. § 501.171(9)(a).
70. Id. § 501.171(9)(b).
71. Id. § 501.171(9).
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measures that companies can implement to mitigate their litigation
exposure in this area.
II. A SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Data breach cases typically include one or more of three different
categories of alleged injuries: (1) the plaintiff’s personal or financial
information has been stolen by a third party, and that party has used that
information illegally (i.e. to make purchases using the plaintiff’s money);
(2) the plaintiff’s information has been accessed but that information has
not been used (i.e. to open bank accounts, make unauthorized purchases,
or otherwise harm the plaintiff), yet, the plaintiff still claims other forms
of damages (i.e. incurring costs for credit-monitoring services, paying the
cost of cancelling and receiving new bank bards, suffering loss of reward
points from cancelled cards, and experiencing general anxiety that their
information will be used in an unauthorized manner in the future); and
(3) the plaintiff brings a suit based on a belief that his information is not
being protected and a third party could potentially access it in the future.72
From these above categories of injuries, those in (1) involve an injury
sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement, those in (2) are the type
of injuries involved in the circuit split that focuses on whether the indirect
costs and expenses are sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement,
and those in (3) are the least likely to meet the injury-in-fact
requirement.73
The lack of a uniform standard set by the Supreme Court for what
constitutes injury in the context of data breaches has resulted in a circuit
split as to how much injury is sufficient for standing purposes. Generally,
the First, Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have consistently rejected
a finding of standing for alleged injury categories (2) and (3) above, while
emphasizing that the assessment of risk of future harm is a fact-specific
inquiry.74 Conversely, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
consistently held that the alleged injury category (2)—risk of future harm
from a data breach that has already occurred—was an injury sufficient
for standing.75

72. Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data
Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 398, 399, 404 (2014).
73. Id. at 398, 399, 404.
74. Silverman, supra note 13, at 217.
75. Silverman, supra note 13, at 217.
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A. First Things First: Standing
1. The “Injury-in-Fact” Requirement
The Constitution establishes Article III standing as a “threshold
question in every federal court case.”76 To satisfy this standing
requirement, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury that is: (1) concrete,
particularized and actual or imminent (as opposed to merely conjectural
or hypothetical); (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant; and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.77 Standing
issues for data breach cases usually center around the first requirement—
that there is an “injury-in-fact.” However, the Supreme Court has not yet
directly ruled on this subject in the context of a data breach.
Many data breach cases addressed by lower courts have relied on
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA for guidance on analyzing the
existence of a sufficient injury-in-fact.78 Clapper involved a United States
citizen who engaged in sensitive international communications with
individuals whom they believed might be the targets of American
surveillance at some point in the future under the 2008 Amendments to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.79 The plaintiffs claimed to
have suffered an injury-in-fact because of a reasonable likelihood that
their communications with foreign contacts would be intercepted, and
because the risk of surveillance required them to take costly and
burdensome actions to protect the confidentiality of their
communications.80 However, there was no evidence that the plaintiffs’
communications had been targeted or that the government was going to
target their communications in the future.81
As a result, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the plaintiffs did not
have standing under Article III.82 The Court “reiterated that [the]
‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury-infact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not
sufficient.”83 Specifically, the Court found that plaintiffs’ theory of future
injury was “too speculative,” and not actual or “certainly impending,”
with the plaintiffs’ allegations for standing based on a “highly attenuated
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

United States v. One Lincoln Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2003).
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).
See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
Id. at 401–05.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id. at 409 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
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chain of possibilities.”84 Further, the Court found that plaintiffs’
“contention that they have standing because they incurred certain costs
as a reasonable reaction to a risk of harm [was] unavailing . . . [because
they] cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not
certainly impending.”85
Since Clapper, cases have been inconsistent on the issue of Article III
standing and the injury-in-fact requirement. The injury-in-fact analysis is
very fact-specific in nature, with some courts finding no standing on
imminence grounds, reasoning that the plaintiff had suffered no actual
injury, while others find standing in cases involving similar facts and
claims. In fact, there are several notable data breach and privacy class
action cases that have contributed to this split of authority.
2. Circuits Finding Injury Sufficient for Standing: Third, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, & D.C.
In the Third Circuit, the decision in In re Horizon involved two stolen
laptops that contained unencrypted personal information (specifically,
health insurance data, names, addresses, dates of birth, and social security
numbers) of more than 839,000 Horizon members.86 Of those with
information stolen, only one named plaintiff experienced actual misuse
in the form of a fraudulent tax filing.87 The plaintiffs alleged willful and
negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and numerous
violations of state law, centering around Horizon’s failure to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the stolen laptops and
safeguard the member’s information.88 In its opinion, the court clarified
the standing requirements for plaintiffs asserting violations of certain
federal statutes.89
The court held that the plaintiffs, by alleging an unauthorized transfer
of personal identifying information in violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, had established a sufficient de facto injury for standing,
even if that information was not improperly used.90 This decision
narrowed the lack of standing defense in this particular type of data
84.
85.
86.
2017).
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 401, 410.
Id. at 415.
In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 630 (3d Cir.
Id.
Id. at 629, 631.
Id. at 639−40.
Id. at 629, 636.
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breach case, where the claim involved arose from certain statutory rights.
However, the result still leaves open whether other federal statutes may
recognize data breaches as injuries-in-fact, and whether more technical
violations of statutes could constitute a harm for standing.
In the Sixth Circuit, the data breach in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co., involved the theft of personal information (specifically,
names, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and social security
numbers) of 1.1 million customers of Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company by hackers of the company’s computer network.91 Plaintiffs
sued Nationwide for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act (failure to
adopt adequate procedures to protect personal information) and for
common law torts of negligence and bailment.92 Plaintiffs alleged that
they had incurred costs associated with mitigating the risk, including
purchasing credit reporting and monitoring services for credit reports and
bank statements.93 Ultimately, a split panel held that plaintiffs had
sufficiently demonstrated standing by alleging that the Nationwide hack
had subjected them to significantly heightened risk of fraud and identity
theft.94
The court found that even though plaintiffs claimed no incidences of
actual fraud or identity theft, their claimed injury was not merely
“hypothetical.”95 The court reasoned, while distinguishing the facts of
this case from those in Clapper, “[t]here is no need for speculation where
Plaintiffs allege that their data has already been stolen and is now in the
hands of ill-intentioned criminals. . . . Where a data breach targets
personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
hackers will use the victims’ data for . . . fraudulent purposes.”96 Further,
the court also noted that Nationwide seemed to recognize the severity of
the risk because it offered free credit monitoring and identity theft
protection for one year; thus Nationwide’s mitigation efforts were
actually used against them in the end.97 This decision is one of the most
favorable to plaintiffs in the data breach context because no plaintiffs
even alleged any actual fraud or identity theft as a result of the data theft.
In the Seventh Circuit, the data breach in Remijas involved hackers
attacking Neiman Marcus and stealing the credit card numbers of
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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approximately 350,000 of its customers.98 Some of these customers found
fraudulent charges on their cards around the same time of the breach.99
The court asserted that Clapper did not consummately bar consumers
from bringing suit based on substantial risk of future injury and found
that the costs incurred by the plaintiffs were material enough to be
considered particularized injuries.100 Neiman Marcus’ major objection
was that the plaintiffs could not show that their injuries were fairly
traceable to the Neiman Marcus breach instead of a breach involving
Target, which occurred around the same time.101 The court responded by
stating that, “if there are multiple companies that could have exposed the
plaintiffs’ private information to hackers, then the common law of torts
has long shifted the burden of proof to defendants to prove that their
negligent actions were not the ‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”102
The court ultimately held that “injuries associated with resolving
fraudulent charges and protecting oneself against future identity theft”
were sufficient to confer Article III standing.103
In the Ninth Circuit, the data breach in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.
involved the theft of a laptop containing the personal information
(specifically, names, addresses, and social security numbers) of
Starbucks employees.104 While the leaked information had not yet been
misused, the plaintiff’s sued Starbucks for negligence and breach of
implied contract, emphasizing that the data leaked had increased their risk
of identity theft.105 Here, the court asserted that plaintiffs alleged “a
credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of the
laptop containing their unencrypted personal data.”106 It explained that
had the allegation been more conjectural or hypothetical (i.e., if no laptop
had been stolen and the plaintiffs sued based on the risk that it would be
stolen in the future), the threat would be much less credible.107 Thus,
plaintiff’s satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing
by stating that an injury-in-fact can be satisfied by a threat of future harm,
or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 696.
Id.
Id.
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1140–41.
Id. at 1143.
Id.
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harm that plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent defendant’s
actions.108
Though Krottner occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Clapper, the Ninth Circuit subsequently decided another data breach case
in In re Zappos.com, Inc., where it reiterated its expansive view of
injuries involving the risk of future harm for standing.109 In that case, the
court unanimously held that plaintiffs, whose personal information
(specifically, payment card data) was stolen but not actually misused, had
standing to sue because they faced a substantial risk of identity theft.110
This is important because it held that Krottner is still good law after the
decision in Clapper.111
Finally, in the D.C. Circuit, the data breach in Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.
involved a cyberattack where 1 million CareFirst’s customers’ personal
information (specifically, names, dates of birth, email addresses, and
subscriber information) was stolen.112 Plaintiffs argued that CareFirst
violated state laws and legal duties by failing to safeguard their
information and exposing them to an increased risk of identity theft.113
The court stated that this injury was sufficient to establish standing
because it was “at the very least . . . plausible” to infer that the hackers
had the intent and ability to use the stolen data for illegal purposes.114
The above cases from this side of the circuit split present the hurdles
a defendant must clear to secure dismissal of a data breach claim.
Generally, they collectively held that the risk of future harm from a data
breach was, on its face, injury sufficient for standing. Based on these
plaintiff-favorable rulings on the standing issue, these circuits will likely
emerge as the forums of choice for data breach class actions. And as the
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in 2018 for CareFirst, this split
remains in place for the foreseeable future.
3. Circuits Finding No Injury Sufficient for Standing: First, Second,
Fourth, & Eighth
In the First Circuit, the case of Katz v. Pershing involved a unique set
of facts in this context because the case was actually filed before any data

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1023, 1030.
Id. at 1023.
Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622–23 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 865 F.3d at 622.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 628.
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breach occurred.115 Plaintiff alleged that she experienced an increased
risk of potential future loss due to the defendant’s alleged failure to
adhere to reasonable security practices and privacy regulations.116 The
court held that such allegations were not sufficient to meet the
requirements for Article III standing.117 It reasoned that the allegations of
harm were too speculative and could not show impending injury because
the facts alleged left too many unknown variables, including whether the
plaintiff’s data would actually be stolen or lost, and even then, whether
the data would be misused in a way that would harm her.118 Ultimately,
the plaintiff’s standing theory rested “entirely on the hypothesis that at
some point an unauthorized, as-yet unidentified, third party might access
her data and then attempt to purloin her identity.”119
In the Second Circuit, the data breach in Whalen v. Michaels Stores,
Inc. involved the theft of customers’ credit card and debit card data
(specifically, card numbers and expiration dates).120 Relying on the
standard from Clapper, the court deemed the named plaintiff’s allegation
of two attempted fraudulent credit card charges insufficient to make the
risk of future harm “certainly impending.”121 Because plaintiff was never
asked to pay, nor did she pay, any fraudulent charges and because her
stolen credit card was promptly canceled after the breach and no other
personally identifying information (such as her date of birth or social
security number) was alleged to have been stolen, the court concluded
that she had alleged no injury that would satisfy the constitutional
standing requirements of Article III.122
In the Fourth Circuit, Beck v. McDonald consolidated two cases
against a Veteran’s hospital.123 The first involved a stolen laptop with
limited data (specifically, names, dates of birth, last four digits of social
security numbers, and physical descriptors) and the second involved
stolen boxes of pathology files with information (specifically, names,
social security numbers, and medical diagnoses) about deceased
persons.124 Interestingly, the court denied standing for both sets of facts,
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 64 (1st Cir. 2012).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 80–81.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 79.
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 90–91.
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 267, 268.
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but adopted the reasoning from Krottner and Remijas (which, as
explained above, are on the opposite side of the circuit split), implying
that some breaches do make future harm certainly impending.125
Ultimately, it seems that, for this specific case, the fact that three years
had passed without any visible misuse of the personal information proved
decisive and the court found that the threat of identity theft stemming
from these breaches was too speculative to establish an injury-in-fact for
these claims.126
In the Eighth Circuit, In re SuperValu, Inc. involved two data breaches
on a chain of retail grocery stores in which hackers gained access to the
payment information of customers (specifically, names, credit or debit
card numbers, card expiration dates, card verification value codes, and
personal identification numbers).127 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant failed to take adequate measures to protect customers’
information; for example, the defendant allegedly used default or
common passwords, failing to lock out users after several failed login
attempts and not segregating access to different parts of the computer
network or use firewalls to protect customer information.128 The plaintiffs
claimed that customer information was stolen as a result of the breaches,
subjecting plaintiffs to “an imminent and real possibility of identity
theft.”129 One plaintiff also alleged that he suffered a fraudulent charge
on his credit card statement, resulting in the replacement of the card.130
In the end, however, the court found that the individual plaintiffs who had
not experienced any fraudulent charges or identity theft following the
breaches and had not sufficiently alleged a substantial risk of future
injury.131 But the court did find that the injury of the one plaintiff who
alleged fraudulent use of this card gave rise to standing in his individual
case.132
The above cases from this side of the circuit split have generally held
that plaintiffs must allege an actual injury in the form of fraudulent
charges on existing credit or debit card accounts or the opening of
fraudulent financial accounts resulting from their stolen personal
information to establish the requisite injury-in-fact for Article III
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 273, 274.
Id. at 274–75.
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 771–72.
Id. at 774.
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standing. They have determined that general allegations of a heightened
risk of identity theft from stolen personal information alone do not
constitute an injury-in-fact, raising the pleading requirements for
plaintiffs in data breach cases in these jurisdictions. Thus, with the circuit
split firmly in place, the potential for standing will largely depend on both
where the suit is filed and on that court’s interpretation of the standard to
prove sufficient standing.133
B. Next Step: Causation & Redressability
For those cases that are fortunate enough based on their particular
factual situations to make it past the first hurdle of injury-in-fact for
Article III standing, the next challenge presented focuses on causation
and redressability. The data breach context presents a somewhat unique
circumstance surrounding causation (typically meaning that the injury
must be fairly traceable) because of the ability of a data thief to aggregate
data from multiple sources. This creates issues for courts who enforce a
strict “rule of enablement,” which means that the data stolen must have
been sufficient by itself to enable the alleged misuse.134 And while
forensic testing may reveal how a breach was achieved and what data was
stolen, such evidence-based results seldom exist to prove a direct
connection between the act of the breach and a particular subsequent
misuse that resulted in injury.135
As noted by the court in Remijas above, once a set of mostly
immutable personal information has been involved in multiple breaches,
causation becomes an even harder element to prove.136 Courts have
approached this issue in different ways. Most notable from a public policy
standpoint was that of In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation, where the court “refused to consider that any instances of
actual misuse might have resulted from other data breaches, as this would
create a perverse incentive for stewards of consumer data.”137 But some
courts analyzing data breach cases deem that this standing requirement
has been satisfied where a business admits customer information has been
exposed by issuing data breach notifications (as they are legally required
to give such notifications under state privacy laws) or where a business

133. See Cease, supra note 72, at 404.
134. See David L. Silverman, Developments in Data Security Breach Liability, 73 BUS. LAW.
215, 218–19 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 Data Breach Developments].
135. See Silverman, supra note 13, at 221.
136. See Silverman, supra note 13, at 221–22.
137. See Silverman, supra note 13, at 222.
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issues new customer cards themselves due to a breach.138 Ultimately,
some courts are more reluctant than others to recognize causation, so
jurisdiction choice will also impact this outcome regarding the standing
determination.
Redressability is the final step in the Article III standing analysis, and
it has been invoked the least often in data breach cases.139 The injurious
standard to satisfy is that “it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that [an] injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”140
Major issues in this area typically center around failures to allege any
quantifiable damages resulting from the breach and instances where
credit card companies or other parties have already remedied some of the
victims’ injuries.141 If these issues are present, the plaintiffs’ claimed
injuries may struggle to pass the test for redressability.
III. ATTEMPTS AT A FEDERAL STANDARD & FORTHCOMING STATE
LEGISLATION
Though there have been a number of attempts at passing a uniform
federal standard, the United States lacks a comprehensive federal law that
regulates the collection and use of consumer personal information. As a
result, many states have passed their own laws, which often contain
different and sometimes incompatible provisions regarding what
categories and types of personal information are protected or which
entities are covered. In addition, the judicial circuits have also diverted
from a single interpretation in the data breach standing context, which
only adds to the inconsistency and confusion across the board. Congress’s
ability to successfully pass a uniform federal data breach standard is
highly dependent on the political state of the country, and with the current
stark divide surrounding political views on the subject of federal
regulation, such a federal standard is not likely to be enacted anytime
soon. Fortunately, California’s new privacy regulation possesses the
potential to cause a seismic shift in the landscape of data privacy law, not
just in California, but across the country.

138. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015); In re
Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 309 F.R.D. 482, 487 (D. Minn. 2015).
139. See 2017 Data Breach Developments, supra note 134, at 220.
140. Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
141. See, e.g., Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 857 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
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A. Attempts at a Federal Standard
Many have called on Congress to enact flexible and technologically
neutral privacy and security laws. For example, in 2014, the “Data
Security Breach Notification Act” was introduced in the Senate; however,
it did not move past referral to a Senate subcommittee.142 Then, the
Barack Obama presidential administration put forth plans in 2015 for the
“Personal Data Notification & Protection Act,” which proposed many
measures aimed at promoting data security, data privacy, and protection
against identity theft, including a “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”143
This was largely based on the Fair Information Practice Principles, which
are thought of as general processes and procedures that organizations
should implement, recognizing that Americans have a strong interest in
how information about them is collected, used, and shared by
companies.144
The 2015 Act aimed to protect “sensitive personally identifiable
information,” including: (1) first and last name in combination with
several different elements; (2) a government-issued identification
number, including a social security number or driver’s license number;
(3) biometric data including fingerprints or voice prints; (4) unique
account identifiers; and (5) a username in combination with a password
or security question.145 It also contained a strict standard of notification
requirements which would have been enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission and state Attorney Generals.146 A major point of contention
in this bill was that the Personal Data Notification & Protection Act
would supersede any state laws covering breaches of computerized data
from businesses.147 Unfortunately, this proposal lost momentum shortly
after a draft of the bill was put forward and it also did not move past
subcommittee review.148 Most recently, the Donald J. Trump presidential
142. See Martha Wrangham & Gretchen A. Ramos, Calls for Federal Breach Notification
Law Continue After Yahoo Data Breach, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/calls-federal-breach-notification-law-continue-after-yahoo-data-breach.
143. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN CONSUMERS
& FAMILIES (Jan. 12, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/12/
fact-sheet-safeguarding-american-consumers-families.
144. See Brendan McDermid, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approachdata-protection.
145. Personal Data Notification & Protection Act, H.R. 1704, 114th Cong. § 112(12) (2015).
146. Id. at § 101(c); see also id. §§ 107–108 (explaining the rules and methods of
enforcement).
147. See id. § 109.
148. See Wrangham & Ramos, supra note 142.
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administration’s lack of appetite for technology policy or regulation in
general has left this issue and any attempts at a federal data breach
standard at a standstill for the foreseeable future.149
B. The California Consumer Privacy Act
California has always had a strong policy regarding the subject of
privacy, often enumerating more elaborate and stricter privacy laws than
other states. In fact, California even enumerated the right to privacy in its
constitution.150 Once again, California is charging forward in the world
of privacy legislation and on June 28, 2018, with subsequent minor
amendments, it has enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA).151 The CCPA will go into effect starting January 1, 2020, and it
will generally restrict certain businesses’ ability to collect and sell the
“personal information” of consumers.152 Though the CCPA will take
effect in a single state, its reach will extend well beyond the borders of
California, and its expansive protections mark a major shift in the nation’s
data privacy regime.153
The CCPA applies to any for-profit business (regardless of where it is
located) that collects the personal information of California residents and
satisfies at least one of the following criteria:
(1) generates gross revenues above $25 million (and such
threshold is not limited to revenue earned in the State of
California), (2) engages in the buying, selling, receiving, or
sharing of the personal information of at least 50,000
California residents, households, or internet-connected
devices, or (3) derives at least 50% of its annual revenues
from the sale of consumers’ personal information.154
The definition of this type of business for purposes of the CCPA also
includes “[a]ny entity that controls or is controlled by a business, as

149. See McDermid, supra note 144.
150. CAL. CONST. art I, § 1 (providing that “[a]ll people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights . . . enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy”).
151. See WILSON C. FREEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.: LEGAL SIDEBAR, CALIFORNIA
DREAMIN’ OF PRIVACY REGULATION: THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT AND CONGRESS 1
(Nov. 1, 2018).
152. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105.
153. See FREEMAN, supra note 151.
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1).
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defined in [the main “business” definition], and that shares common
branding with the business.155
The CCPA also contains a limited number of exemptions to the
definition of “business.” If every aspect of the commercial conduct takes
place wholly outside of California, then such business is exempt from the
CCPA.156 Also exempted from its coverage is the collection of certain
information covered by other statutes, including HIPAA, the FCRA, the
GLBA, and the DPPA, as well as “publicly available information,” which
includes information lawfully made available from government
records.157 The CCPA’s definition of “personal information” is very
inclusive, encompassing all “information that identifies, relates to,
describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”158
155. Id. § 1798.140(c)(2).
156. Id. § 1798.145(a)(6).
157. Id. § 1798.145. See also FREEMAN, supra note 151, at 2.
158. Id. § 1798.140(o)(1). The CCPA includes examples of what is included in the definition
of “personal information”:
(A) Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique personal
identifier, online identifier, internet protocol address, email address, account
name, social security number, driver’s license number, passport number, or other
similar identifiers.
(B) Any categories of personal information described in subdivision (e) of
Section 1798.80.
(C) Characteristics of protected classifications under California or federal law.
(D) Commercial information, including records of personal property, products
or services purchased, obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming
histories or tendencies.
(E) Biometric information.
(F) Internet or other electronic network activity information, including, but not
limited to, browsing history, search history, and information regarding a
consumer’s interaction with an internet website, application, or advertisement.
(G) Geolocation data.
(H) Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar information.
(I) Professional or employment-related information.
(J) Education information, defined as information that is not publicly available
personally identifiable information as defined in the Family Educational Rights
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Such a broad definition illustrates the intent of the CCPA’s drafters
regarding the statute’s breath and its ability to provide expansive
protections to consumers.159 And ultimately, even with the exemptions,
these provisions will likely reach a considerable number of businesses
with a website accessible in California.
The CCPA confers three major “rights” on consumers: the “right to
know,” the “right to opt out,” and the “right to delete.”160 The “right to
know” is derived from the fact that businesses must, in advance of any
collection, “inform consumers [by mail or electronically] as to the
categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes for
which the categories of personal information shall be used.”161 Further,
in addition to requiring this advance collection disclosure, consumers also
have the right to request that a business that collects personal information
about the consumer disclose to the consumer the specific pieces of
personal information that the business has collected or sold from the
consumer, the categories of sources from which the information was
collected, the business purposes for collecting or selling the personal
information, and the third parties with whom the information was
shared.162
Next, the “right to opt out” derives from the requirement that
businesses must inform consumers of the right to opt out of the sale of a
consumer’s information, and if a consumer so directs a business not to
sell the consumer’s personal information, the business cannot again sell
the consumer’s information unless the consumer subsequently provides
the business express authorization.163 It also requires an affirmative “opt
and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232g; 34 C.F.R. Part 99).
(K) Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this subdivision
to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences,
characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes,
intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes. Id.
159. See FREEMAN, supra note 151, at 3.
160. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.120, 1798.105.
161. Id. § 1798.100(b). This information will be provided to the consumer free of charge. Id.
§ 1798.100(d).
162. Id. § 1798.110(a).
163. Id. § 1798.120. With respect to the “right to opt-out,” businesses must provide a “clear
and conspicuous link” on their homepage entitled “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” that
opens an Internet Web page enabling a consumer to opt-out of the sale of the consumer’s personal
information. Id. § 1798.135(a)(1). Additionally, the business must also include a description of
consumers’ opt-out rights, along with a separate link to the “Do Not Sell My Personal
Information” webpage in its online privacy policy. Id. § 1798.135(a)(2).
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in” for consumers under the age of 16 (by the consumer directly if they
are between the ages of 13 and 16 or by the consumer’s parent of guardian
if the consumer is under 13).164 Finally, the “right to delete” derives from
the requirement that businesses, if requested by a consumer, must delete
any information collected about such consumer.165 The CCPA provides
some exceptions to this right, including: when the information is needed
to complete a particular transaction for the consumer, to detect security
incidents or protect against fraud, or where such retention enables solely
internal uses that are reasonably aligned with the expectations of the
consumer based on the consumer’s relationship with the business.166
As an additional protection for consumers, the CCPA contains a
nondiscrimination rule to backstop the discussed rights. Specifically, it
provides that no business may discriminate against a consumer by
“denying goods or services,” by “charging different prices or rates,” or
by “providing a different level or quality of goods or services” to
consumers who exercise their rights under the CCPA.167 However, the
CCPA does allow businesses to “offer financial incentives” for the
collection, sale, or non-deletion of personal information. It also provides
that a business may offer a different price to consumers who exercise their
rights “if that price . . . is directly related to the value provided to the
consumer by the consumer’s data.”168
Enforcement of the CCPA will largely fall under the authority of the
California Attorney General. Businesses that are in violation of the CCPA
and do not cure those violations within 30 days are liable for civil
penalties of up to $2,500 for each violation, which increases to $7,500 if
the violation is intentional.169 Moreover, it gives California residents a
civil right of action for injunctive or declaratory relief, as well as
monetary damages (no less than $100 and no more than $750 per
incident, or actual damages, whichever is greater) against businesses that
fail to implement reasonable security measures to protect their personal
information.170 Significantly, “reasonable security measures” are not
defined by the CCPA, and in the absence of a specified definition, a
definition will likely be determined by the judicial system and analyzed
164. Id. § 1798.120(d).
165. Id. § 1798.105. Following such a request, the business must delete the information from
its own records, as well as the records of it service providers. Id. § 1798.105(c).
166. Id. § 1798.105(d).
167. Id. § 1798.125(a)(1).
168. Id. §§ 1798.125(b)(1), (a)(2).
169. Id. § 1798.155(b).
170. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1).
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on a case-by-case basis. Such actions can only be brought if a consumer
provides a business with 30 days’ written notice and provides the
business with the opportunity to “cure” the violation, unless the consumer
suffered actual pecuniary damages.171 This safe harbor cuts both ways:
on the one hand, it will provide business with advance notice of the claims
and the ability to engage plaintiffs before litigation progresses; and on the
other hand, because of the uncertainty in the statute as drafted (i.e., how
to “cure” is not defined), it is not clear what an actual cure of a data breach
would look like.172
Overall, the CCPA will regulate how businesses with an online
presence in California collect, share, and use consumer personal
information. This unprecedented change in California’s privacy law will
invite an explosion of consumer litigation as plaintiffs seek to recover
statutory damages under the private right of action.173 Whereas thus far,
plaintiffs have often struggled to sufficiently demonstrate that theft of
their data has resulted in an injury-in-fact for standing purposes, the new
allowance for statutory damages has cleared a major litigation hurdle for
plaintiffs since they will no longer need to demonstrate that an actual
financial injury has been suffered.174 It is very likely that because of its
expansive scope and jurisdictional reach, the CCPA will become the
standard for best practices in privacy and data protection for United States
residents unless it is later preempted by federal law, or another state
adopts a law with more demanding requirements.
IV. POTENTIAL MITIGATION OF LITIGATION EXPOSURE
The best chance for avoiding litigation exposure from the company’s
perspective, is to implement adequate security measures to prevent data
breaches in the first place. As previously stated, the federal and state data
security statutes generally require that companies in possession of
customer personal information implement adequate security measures,
though they do not offer any further explanation of what would qualify
or how such companies should assess vulnerabilities. For some guidance
on this matter, the Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security
Controls identifies a minimum level of information security that all
organizations that collect or maintain personal information should meet
in order to meet the standard for reasonable security.175 The minimum
security controls for effective cyber defense are listed below.176
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. § 1798.150(b).
See Buese, supra note 22.
See Buese, supra note 22.
See Buese, supra note 22.
See HARRIS, supra note 21, at 30.
See HARRIS, supra note 21, app. at 39.
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CSC 1 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
CSC 2 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software
CSC 3 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices,
Laptops, Workstations and Servers
CSC 4 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
CSC 5 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
CSC 6 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs
CSC 7 Email and Web Browser Protection
CSC 8 Malware Defenses
CSC 9 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services
CSC 10 Data Recovery Capability
CSC 11 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers,
and Switches
CSC 12 Boundary Defense
CSC 13 Data Protection
CSC 14 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
CSC 15 Wireless Access Control
CSC 16 Account Monitoring and Control
CSC 17 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps
CSC 18 Application Software Security
CSC 19 Incident Response and Management
CSC 20 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises

These controls should serve as a starting point, and the failure to
implement all twenty that apply to a particular company’s data
environment could constitute a lack of reasonable security.177
Further, companies should make multi-factor authentication available
on consumer-facing online accounts that contain sensitive personal
information, such as requiring something biometric (i.e., a fingerprint) or
an additional code to enter that comes through as a text or other one-timepassword token.178 Such requirements would make it much more difficult
for a third party to breach the account because access to the account
would require more than just the baseline username and password
combination. Companies are also well advised to consistently use strong
177. See HARRIS, supra note 21, at 30.
178. See HARRIS, supra note 21, at 34–35.
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encryption methods to protect personal information on mobile electronic
devices (such as laptop computers or smart phones) that could be
physically lost or stolen.179 Ultimately, in this context the motto really is
“better safe than sorry.” When in doubt it is better to implement as many
security controls as are feasibly possible for the particular type and size
of the company, based upon the sensitivity of the stored personal
information.
Additional methods for reducing a company’s litigation exposure
incorporate the use of an arbitration clause and a class action waiver in
the website’s terms and conditions, which could prohibit users from
prompting mass litigation.180 The Supreme Court has confirmed that class
action waivers in arbitrations provisions are enforceable.181 Such
arbitration provisions and waivers should be conspicuous both in the
company’s notice of its terms and conditions for service, and in the terms
and conditions themselves.182 For example, to maximize the likelihood of
enforcement, they should be “easily accessible and displayed in a
sufficiently large viewing window to provide the user an adequate
opportunity to review the terms, thereby eliminating any doubts that a
reasonable user would have noticed them” and they should include easily
understandable, balanced provisions to avoid a finding of
unconscionability.183 Additionally, best practices would require users to
affirmatively accept the contractual terms before proceeding to the next
step in the transaction or service provided.184
CONCLUSION
Protection of consumer personal information is a major issue faced
not only by Americans, but by consumers across the globe. Both the
frequency and severity of data breaches in the modern day of technology
and internet usage have consistently increased throughout the twentieth
century, developing into what some consider to be a modern “data breach
epidemic.” Neither federal nor state regulations fully address this
epidemic in a way that provides consumers and businesses with clarity
regarding their respective rights and duties post-data breach.185 After their
personal information is exposed, consumers face uncertainty in seeking
relief, and the current circuit split in this area makes the choice of where
179. See HARRIS, supra note 21, at 36.
180. See Buese, supra note 22.
181. See Buese, supra note 22; see, e.g., DirecTV Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
182. See Buese, supra note 22.
183. Buese, supra note 22.
184. See Buese, supra note 22.
185. See Jones, supra note 20, at 813.
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to file a claim of paramount importance if the injury is based on the theory
of an increased risk of future harm (such as the increased risk for identity
theft). From the perspective of businesses in possession of consumer
personal information, conflicting laws relating to compliance creates an
unnecessary burden for large businesses that operate in multiple
jurisdictions.
There have been some attempts at a federal standard, but none have
ultimately succeeded. Though it seems unlikely under the current
political climate, enacting a federal data breach notification and data
protection statute would go a long way in solving many of the issues
currently faced by consumers and businesses. Confronted with this
intimidating and rapidly changing technological landscape, California’s
new sweeping privacy legislation, the CCPA (effective January 1, 2020),
will impose a multitude of new, extremely demanding notice, disclosure,
and consent requirements on an array of business entities that conduct
operations or handle the personal information of California residents. The
CCPA will likely cause a shift in the landscape of data privacy law not
just in California, but across the entire United States.
The data breach epidemic is not going away anytime soon, so in the
meantime consumers should take extra precautions when evaluating
whether, and with whom, they share their personal information.
Additionally, businesses that use, collect, or store consumer personal
information should maximize their security controls in place to prevent
or decrease the likelihood of a data breach, and should also incorporate
the use of both class action waivers and mandatory arbitration provisions
to mitigate the potential effects of post-data breach litigation.

